Abstract. 0 # can be invisibly class generic.
Introduction
Roughly, the main theorem of this paper is that some instances of any type of nonconstructible object are class generic over L, in one sense. Since small large cardinal properties are inherited in L, let us begin by considering the sense in which 0 # can be generic.
It is well known that 0 This confirms a conjecture of Sy Friedman. The subset of ω satisfying "x is 0 # " in L κ [G] may or may not be the "real 0 # ," that is, the set assumed to exist in the hypothesis of Theorem 1.
Note the omission of the predicates P and G in the conclusion of the theorem. It is in this sense that 0 # can be "invisibly generic."
As suggested at the outset, the theorem proved in §2 is substantially more general than Theorem 1. For example, any large cardinal incompatible with V =L can be invisibly generic in the same sense.
Theorem 2. Suppose that T ⊇ ZFC is a first-order theory in the language of set theory and that T has a countable standard transitive model V. Let κ be the least ordinal not in V and suppose that T ∈ L κ and that κ is definably regular in L δ , where δ is the least admissible ordinal greater than κ. Then there exists an L κ -amenable forcing property P T such that
(1) L κ ; P T is a model of ZFC in the language {∈, P} that includes a predicate symbol for P T ; and
In addition to Theorem 2, this paper considers four related matters. The first two, which appear in §3, are remarks on the proof of Theorem 2. One is that if T V =L, then T has 2 ω many non-isomorphic (in the language of set theory) P T -generic models. The other is that the forcing relation for P T is definable.
The second two, which appear in §4, regard the hypothesis in Theorem 2 that κ is definably regular in L δ . Proposition 4.1 states that κ must be regular in L δ . Proposition 4.2 examines the extent to which κ must lose its regularity in the presence of a generic 0 # . Very roughly, it holds that no "good" 0 # can be "very generic." Finally, in §5 some open problems are discussed. The following two subsections provide some definitions and references.
Class genericity
As is customary, we systematically confuse a standard structure M ; ∈ M 2 with its universe M . Similarly, we confound partial orderings and their fields of conditions.
Suppose that M is a transitive set or class. When we say that M ; · · · ZFC we mean that the standard structure M , augmented by the predicates, functions, or constants · · · , satisfies ZFC as formulated in a language with symbols for these predicates, functions, and constants. Specifically, ZFC in such a language includes all instances of collection and separation in the augmented language. Because of the importance of auxiliary predicates, rather than relying on this notation, the relevant language often will be indicated.
Although, as the statements of the theorems above indicate, we shall be working largely with countable standard models of ZFC, in order to make our terminology widely applicable, let us frame as much of it as possible in a second-order set theory (class theory) extending ZFC and sanctioning quantification over classes.
Suppose that P is a partial ordering, perhaps a proper class. If G ⊆ P, then G is a filter if G consists of pairwise compatible conditions and G is closed upwards: p ∈ G whenever there exists a q ∈ G such that q p.
Suppose that M is an inner model, that is, a transitive class containing all of the ordinals and satisfying each axiom of ZFC. Define the class M P of Shoenfield terms by recursion:å
For Shoenfield termså, set dom(å) = b : (b, p) ∈å, for some p and
If G is a filter on P, define the value of the Shoenfield termå bẙ
Suppose that x is a set. Then x is set generic over M if there exists a partial ordering P ∈ M and a filter G such that
Say that a set x is M -amenably generic when there exists an (M -amenable) partial ordering P and a filter G such that
(2) M ; P satisfies ZFC in a language with predicate symbols for P; (3) G is M ; P -definably generic, that is, G ∩ D = ∅, for all D ⊆ P that are predense and definable over M ; P ; and (4) M [G]; M, P, G satisfies ZFC in a language with predicate symbols for M , P, and G. A set x is weakly generic when x is M -amenably generic over some inner model M .
Say that a set x is invisibly generic if, for some inner model M , it satisfies the definition of M -amenable genericity with the following weakened clause (4):
This last notion is dicey in class theory, since ZFC fails in M [G]; M, P, G unless x is in fact weakly generic. Consequently, we shall work with set models when dealing with invisible genericity.
Let us recapitulate in this terminology 0 # 's status: It is known that 0 # is neither set generic nor L-amenably generic. Theorem 1 is that it can be invisibly generic. It remains open whether 0 # can be weakly generic.
H(A)
In this section we introduce some notation and state and give references for several standard facts from admissible set theory that figure in later sections.
If X is a transitive set, let o(X) = X ∩ OR.
Then o(X) is the least ordinal that does not lie in X. Suppose that A is a transitive set and that R 1 , . . . , R n are amenable relations on A.
Here cl(X) is the closure of X under the usual Gödel operations, together with the Gödel operations for R 1 , . . . , R n , namely
Say that A is power admissible when it satisfies KP in a language with a function symbol P for the power set operation; that is, A satisfies KP, including instances of Σ 1 -collection and Σ 0 -separation involving R 1 , . . . , R n and P, as well as satisfies the axiom ∀x ∀y y ∈ P(x) ↔ y ⊆ x .
Models of ZFC have natural expansions to power admissible sets. If A is power admissible, then A can be internally resolved into ranks V α , for α < o(A):
In other words
[Our convention is to use blackboard bold for external names of standard transitive structures (and partial orderings). The internal/external distinction is admittedly obscure, since our point of view is continually shifting.]
Then H(A) is the smallest admissible set with A ∈ H(A).
δ is the least admissible ordinal greater than κ. If X ⊆ A is first-order definable over A, then X ∈ H(A). (In fact, if A is countable, then this holds for X that are ∆ 1 1 definable over A, but we shall not need this fact.) Suppose that is a binary relation on some set A. Define the well-founded part of by wf( ) = b ∈ A : pred (b); is well-founded , where pred (b) = { a ∈ A : a b }. Define the rank function ρ on wf( ) as usual:
Then set ρ( ) = sup ρ (b)+1 : b ∈ wf( ) . The following can be found in [B, §V.3] :
Because H(A) is the smallest admissible set above A, the admissible set H(A) is projectible into A. A definition of this notion, together with a proof of the following fact can be found in [B, §V.5] : 
Again, let us remind the reader that L κ [G] is the standard transitive structure consisting of the valueså
. It follows from this hypothesis and the hypothesis that κ is o(V), where V is a model of ZFC, that κ is an inaccessible cardinal in H(L κ ).
Note also that, for all n, we have that κ is the Σ n -projectum of δ, where L δ = H(L κ ). This observation will be used in the proof of Remark 3.1.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 2. 
The forcing property used to prove Theorem 2 will construct a generic Henkin model of the theory T . The work goes into arranging that exactly the elements of this model are denoted by Shoenfield terms. So there are two sorts of terms that we shall need, namely, the logical terms needed to construct a Henkin model, and the Shoenfield terms whose denotations constitute the generic extension itself. Our first step is to introduce a one-place function symbol F to provide an adequate supply of logical terms.
Let F be a one-place function symbol and let ( †) be a formula of the language {∈, F } formalizing the following: Proof: Working in V define a class forcing property F by f ∈ F iff f is a one-to-one function with dom(f ) ∈ OR and rng(f ) = V β , for some β, and satisfying that β < α whenever f (β) ∈ f (α).
Then F is <∞-closed. Using the axiom of choice in V, an induction on β shows that any V β can be absorbed into the range of a condition extending a given condition. If
Note that ( †) does not require that F restricted to the ordinals is one-to-one, even though both examples given here (< L[0 # ] -enumeration and the previous lemma) have this additional property. That F is not required to be one-to-one is used in the proof of Lemma 2.4 (to see that {θ κ , F (β) ∈ F (α)} is consistent). Theorem 2 will be proved by establishing three lemmas. The first of these lemmas states that a standard transitive Henkin model V G of T can be defined from any
, and the third that
The forcing P T generically builds V G as a Henkin model of T in an infinitary language. There are several ways such a forcing could be defined. As suggested above, our goal is to define P T in such a way that there are enough terms in L P T κ to make the second lemma true, but not so many that the third fails.
Conditions will be pairs (r, s ), where r is a finite piece of the finitary diagram of V G , and s is a finite sequence of approximations to the infinitary elementary diagram of V G . The idea is that the class of r's added by G is accessible to L κ [G] and so provides an adequate supply of Shoenfield terms, but the s 's fit together to form an amenable ω-sequence that cannot be defined over L κ [G] . The s 's are used to hide the scratch work needed to construct V G .
Let us begin by setting up some notation and defining P T . Fix a first order theory T ⊇ ZFC in the language of set theory. Fix a countable ordinal κ such that T ∈ L κ and κ is definably regular in H(L κ ) and T has a standard transitive model V with
It is for this that we take Σ 2 -Skolem hulls, even though each element of
It follows that there exists a commutative system of Σ 2 -elementary embeddings
Let L be the language with ≈ (equality) having the following symbols:
• a two-place relation symbol ∈;
• a one-place function symbol F ; and • constant symbols α, for α < κ.
We shall make use of admissible fragments L H(L γ ) , for γ ∈ X. (For example, see [B, Chapter III] regarding the syntax and semantics of these languages.) As is customary, we identify formulas with sets that code them. Let us assume that logical symbols, as well as the symbols ∈ and F , are coded by hereditarily finite sets, and that the symbol α is coded by α itself. The non-logical symbols of the language L H(L γ ) are ∈, F , and α, for α < γ. The formulas of L H(L γ ) are those L ∞ω formulas formed using these symbols and lying in the admissible set H(L γ ) (and having only finitely many free variables).
sentence that results from conjoining formalizations of the following:
• ∀x x ∈ β ↔ δ<β x ≈ δ , for each β < γ; and
By hypothesis we have that
For γ ∈ X, declare that
Declare that (r, s ) ∈ P iff (r, s ) meets the following four requirements:
Let r be the least γ ∈ X such that r ⊆ L γ . Finally, require that
Note that in clause (4) whether r ∪ j γ n−1 γ (s n−1 ) ∈ S γ does not depend on the choice of γ ∈ X \ max γ n−1 , r . Order P by declaring that (r , s ) (r, s ) iff r ⊇ r and s is an initial segment of s .
Note that P is definable over H(L κ ) and so P is L κ -amenable and L κ ; P ZFC in a language with a predicate symbol for P.
Proof: Fix γ ∈ X. First, let us establish, roughly, that S γ is a "consistency property" in the sense of [B] .
To see this, note first that since θ κ is consistent and
Suppose that s ∈ S γ . The syntax of the infinitary language L H(L γ ) insures the following:
Here ∼ ϕ denotes the result of pushing the initial negation in (¬ϕ) inside ϕ one step.
A little argument is need to see
Work in the real world, where
Indeed, by (D0) we have that S γ = ∅, for all γ ∈ X ∩ κ. And if s ∈ S γ , then certainly s ∪ {θ γ } ∈ S γ . Because j γκ (θ γ ) = θ κ and G is generic, it suffices to see that
is dense in P. Suppose (r, s ) ∈ P. We may assume that n = | s | > 0. Setγ = γ n−1 and γ = min X \max(γ, r ) . Then r ∪jγ γ (s n−1 ) ∈ S γ . Let s be the sequence extending s to length n + 1 such that γ n = γ and s n = jγ γ (s n−1 ) ∪ {θ γ }. Then (r, s ) (r, s ) and lies in the required class of conditions.
Say (¬ϕ) ∈ j γκ (s), where (r, s ) ∈ G and | s | = n and s = s n−1 and γ = γ n−1 . We may assume that γ r . Then r ∪ s ∈ S γ , so r ∪ s ∪ ∼ j −1 γκ (ϕ) ∈ S γ by (D2). Let s be the sequence of length n + 1 extending s with γ n = γ and
It follows from this observation that the L κ ; P -definable class (r , s ) ∈ P : ∼j
is dense below (r, s ) in P. By genericity, we have (Γ2). Similarly, using (D3)-(D8) respectively, we have
In addition to (D3)-(D8) and the genericity of G, propositions (Γ4), (Γ7i ), and (Γ8) use that H(L κ ) = γ∈X∩κ rng(j γκ ).
Finally, note that
This observation uses that
is dense in P, and that j γκ (ϕ) = ϕ when ϕ is basic. Next, we use Γ to construct a model of θ κ . Begin by defining a relation
By (Γ7) we have that ≡ is an equivalence relation. Then there exists a canonical structure A in which elements of the universe are ≡-equivalence classes and
. (This is established by induction on sentences using (Γ1)-(Γ8).) Furthermore, A θ κ by (Γ0), so there exists a unique standard transitive model
Finally, suppose that r is a finite set of basic L H(L κ ) sentences. Then
The next to last equivalence uses that G is generic; the last, that G is a filter.
Proceed by induction on α to see thatF (α)
Proof: Let us call a Shoenfield termå special when, hereditarily, only conditions of the form (r, ∅) occur inå. That is, a is special iff s = ∅ andb is special, for all b , (r, s ) ∈å.
The following two claims suffice to prove the lemma.
Claim. Ifå is a special Shoenfield term, thenå
where TC {å} is the transitive closure of {å}. Noẘ
and forc ∈ dom(b),
for some finite set r of basic sentences such that (r, ∅) ∈b(c).
follows by induction on special terms in TC({å}) thatå It follows by induction onb in TC {å} that if G is L κ ; P -definably generic and
Claim. Suppose thatå is a Shoenfield term and that G is
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Two remarks
This section contains two remarks on Theorem 2. The first of these is that under the hypotheses of Theorem 2, the theory T + θ κ has 2 ω many distinct invisibly generic models iff T + θ κ V =L.
The reader may recall that T is part of θ κ . Nevertheless, we shall write 'T + θ κ ' where 'θ κ ' would suffice to render vividly that we are working with a certain infinitary extension of T .
Our second remark is that the forcing relation for P T is uniformly definable over L κ ; P T .
Suppose that the countable ordinal κ is definably regular in H(L κ ), that T ∈ L κ is a theory in the language of set theory including ZFC, and that T + θ κ is satisfiable. It is not difficult to see that the second order predicate "G is P T generic for L κ ; P Tdefinable predense classes" is Σ Claim. Suppose that (r, s ) ∈ P T is such that n = | s | > 0 and ϕ ∈ s n−1 . Then there exists a δ < λ such that both r ∪ { δ ∈ F (α) }, s and r ∪ { δ / ∈ F (α) }, s are conditions extending (r, s ) in P T .
Proof: Otherwise, set
It follows that for each of 2 We turn now to our second remark, namely, that the forcing relation for P T is definable. This is perhaps surprising since predensity reduction fails for P T and, in fact, generic classes G blatantly ω-cofinalize the ordinals of L κ . It also shows that what is at issue in deciding whether 0 # can be weakly generic is not the definability of the forcing relation.
Originally, I proved that the forcing relation for P T is definable over L κ ; P T , when it restricted to formulas of bounded logical complexity. David Cook extended that argument to show that, in fact, the forcing relation is uniformly definable for all sentences of the forcing language, noting that this does not immediately imply that L[G]-truth is uniformly definable over L [G] , because P T and G are not definable over L [G] .
Even at bit more is true. In the sense made precise by Remark 3.2, the forcing relation is uniformly definable for all sentences of an infinitary forcing language with formulas lying in H(L κ ).
Fix T and set P = P T . The ordinary forcing language for P is the finitary first order language without equality having the following non-logical symbols: two-place relation symbols ∈ and ⊆; and constant symbolså, for each Shoenfield termå ∈ L P κ . As usual, we systematically confuse symbols and formulas with sets coding them in L κ . In the forcing language we treat equality as a defined relation; that is, t ≈ t abbreviates (t ⊆ t ) ∧ (t ⊆ t).
In contrast to visible genericity, the standard structure L κ [G] cannot uniformly define satisfaction for atomic sentences of the forcing language, because the classes L Recall from Lemma 2.5 that special Shoenfield terms are terms that, hereditarily, contain only conditions of the form (r, ∅). Fix any γ ∈ X and work in H(L γ ). Say thatå is a special pseudo-term whenå ∈ L γ andå is a set of pairs b , (r, ∅) , where r is any finite set of basic L H(L γ ) -sentences andb is a special pseudo-term. In particular, consistency of r with θ γ is not required, so special pseudo-terms are not Shoenfield terms, in general. Of course, every special term is a special pseudo-term. The advantage that this notion enjoys is that å ∈ L γ :å is a special psuedo-term is always a set in H(L γ ).
Next, let us define an infinitary forcing language K H(L γ ) . Let K comprise the symbols ∈, ⊆, andå, for all special pseudo-termså. Let K H(L γ ) be the usual infinitary language, namely, the intersection of
Say that a formula ϕ of K H(L γ ) is legitimate when every special pseudo-term occur-
Of course, if ϕ is a finitary legitimate K H(L κ ) -sentence, then ϕ ∈ L γ , for any sufficiently large γ ∈ X ∩ κ, and j γκ (ϕ) = ϕ. Because in a generic extension each Shoenfield term is forced equal to some special Shoenfield term (in the sense of the second Claim in Lemma 2.5), it follows that the forcing relation for first order sentences of the ordinary forcing language is uniformly definable.
whereF is as in Lemma 2.4.
Proof: Proceed by induction on the complexity of ϕ to unwind definitions, using properties (Γ1)-(Γ8) and that every element of
, for some α < κ. Let us illustrate this with two cases:
Working in L κ ; P define the three-place relation by declaring that p γ ϕ iff p ∈ P and γ ∈ X ∩ κ and ϕ is a legitimate sentence of K H(L γ ) and (r, s ) : 0 < | s | = n and γ n−1 γ and
is predense with respect to p. Then is as required.
The regularity of o(V)
Theorem 2's most curious hypothesis is that κ is definably regular in H(L κ ); the most disappointing feature of its proof is that G collapses κ. It is natural to ask whether these are essential features of Theorem 2, or merely accidental ones of the proof given in §2.
The first of these questions can be given a fairly satisfactory answer without much trouble. In the proof only Σ n -definable regularity, for sufficiently large n, is used. On the other hand, κ must be regular in H(L κ ) in the usual sense that no function that is an element of H(L κ ) renders κ singular:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that κ is a countable ordinal and that there exists a real
Proof: Fix such a real x and let "0 Suppose now that f : λ → κ, for some λ < κ, and that f ∈ L δ , hence f ∈ A. We maintain that the range of f is bounded in κ.
where t is a term and ι 1 < · · · < ι n < κ and κ = γ 1 < A · · · < A γ k are indiscernibles in the sense of A. (Of course, some of the γ i 's need not be genuine ordinals.) Let
We cannot give as satisfactory an answer regarding the extent to which κ must lose its regularity. Note that G ∈ H L κ ; P T [G] in the proof of Theorem 2, since
Only with an additional hypothesis-and some effort-can we give an upper bound on how long o(V) can remain regular.
Say that a filter G ⊆ P is hyper-generic over the countable standard transitive model V; P when G ∩ D = ∅, for all predense D that are definable over H V; P . Of course if G is hyper-generic over V; P , then G is V; P -definably generic.
If The proof will be recycled in the next section to prove Proposition 5.1. Proof: Set λ = o(V). Note that λ, V, P ∈ H V; P . Because P ∈ H V; P ) and G is hyper-generic, we have that H V; P [G] is admissible. (This is the only use made of G's hyper-genericity.) We also have that G ∈ H( V; P ) [G] .
The proof comes in three parts. Assuming for a contradiction that λ is definably regular in H V; P 
, where κ = X ∩λ is some limit cardinal of uncountable cofinality in V [G] . Note that κ is inaccessible in V, since V "0
[Checking this requires some calculations. Note that H(A) is Σ 1 definable over H(A) [G ] and that 
Part II. Choose
∈ H(A) to be a well-founded relation on V κ having rank δ. Let ρ : V κ → δ be the rank function for :
IfC is a club subset of ι 0 and lies in
It follows by Lemma 4.3.5 below that K \ β ⊆ I ∩ κ. Hence K \ β is an unbounded set of indiscernibles for L κ . Since κ is inaccessible in V and since K ∈ H(A) ⊆ V, it follows that V "0 
Proof: 
Proof: If j is trivial, then the corollary just restates Lemma 4.3.1. Otherwise, use Lemma 4.3.2, as well.
Let us next introduce some notation. First of all, ifῑ < ι are indiscernibles, let jῑ ι be the embedding induced by omitting I ∩ [ῑ, ι). That is, let ι ξ : ξ ∈ OR enumerate the Silver indiscernibles I monotonically; ifῑ < ι in I, sayῑ = ι α and ι = ι β , let jῑ ι : L → L be the elementary embedding induced by
Next, let us introduce some notation regarding L-ultrapowers. If j: L → L is any elementary embedding and κ is the critical point of j, then define a normal L-ultrafilter on κ by X ∈ U j iff X is a constructible subset of κ and κ ∈ j(X).
is (a Scott representative of) the equivalence class of the function id x with domain κ, taking the value x identically. Also as usual, let σ:
Finally, let µ: σ" Ult(L, U j ) ∼ = L be the transitive collapse of the range of σ. Define to be the compositions of these functions: 
Thus when j = j ιι * it suffices to see that µ is the identity function, that is, that rng(σ) = L. Now rng(j) ⊆ rng(σ) by the above calculation. Thus I \ {ι} ⊆ rng(σ). It suffices to see that ι ∈ rng(σ). For this, we need a constructible f : ι → ι such that j(f )(ι) = ι. The diagonal function f (α) = α is such a function. In order to make such a question precise-lacking some greater metaphysics-we should seek to isolate some internally accessible property that decides whether 0 # is generic. By "the real 0 # ," then, we mean the 0 # of the ambient universe, perhaps assuming ancillary axioms.
Making sense of this project may well require that "internal accessibility" be understood generously. Class genericity is at best a second-order property. Furthermore, by Theorem 2, there is no first-order statement dictating that 0 # is not invisibly generic. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the real 0 [SF] has found a real x such that 0 < c x < c 0 # and x is not L-amenably generic.
Working over the minimum model of ZFC, [S1] produces a "diagonally generic" real that is not weakly generic. Of course, the minimum model does not support a 0 # . And the method of [S1] is tied to minimality.
Finally,
